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Corporate corruption has become a pervasive problem in our society, as scandals erupt 
with disheartening regularity.  These unethical business practices result, not only in financial 
disaster, but also in the disillusionment and loss of trust on the part of consumers and 
shareholders alike.  Unethical behavior often originates with top management.  However, these 
people cannot act on their own.  They must have the complicit support of others within the 
organization.  In this paper, we examine the pressures and motives of people deep within the 
corporation; the ordinary people who, by just going about their everyday jobs, enable these 
scandals to take place.  Administrative Evil was originally conceived to understand the Jewish 
Holocaust.  It provides an explanatory framework to understand the tendency towards 
dehumanization and the rationalization of unethical behaviors.  Using the Wells Fargo account 
scandal as an illustration, we integrate Administrative Evil with theories from Organizational 
Psychology which strive to understand group pressure for social conformity.  We conclude with 
recommendations to prevent unethical attitudes and behaviors from permeating the organization.  
Specifically, we recommend servant leadership training, employee training and accountability, 
properly aligned reward systems, and influence tactics geared towards helping well-meaning 
employees question their directives without fear of retribution.     
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I KNEW IT WAS WRONG, BUT I WAS JUST DOING MY JOB 
The public perception of business caring only about profit has persisted throughout 
history. Indeed, from ancient Greek civilizations to some modern political philosophies, those 
who engage in commercial activities are sometimes viewed as less virtuous than those who work 
in other occupations. Part of this modern perspective could be due to the negative publicity 
surrounding the misdeeds of corporate leaders such as those involved in the Enron, WorldCom, 
and Volkswagen scandals. Unscrupulous corporate leaders deserve being labeled dishonest and 
corrupt in business dealings, but it is important to consider how corporate leaders manage to 
succeed in executing the fraudulent behavior. Corporate leaders are responsible for developing 
business strategy for the firm, but implementing the strategy requires the assistance and 
cooperation of employees who must provide detailed reports on sales figures, vendor contracts, 
departmental budgets, and other operational issues to carry out the strategy. Thus, the CEO 
cannot continue to engage in fraudulent behavior without help from others. This is not an attempt 
to blame others for the CEO’s actions, but rather, an attempt to consider the crucial role that 
employees play in carrying out executive directives and the inner workings of an organization to 
carry out its mission and strategy. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to address when the 
routine administrative tasks carried out by employees result in great harm to others, to explain 
the psychological reasons for engaging in such behavior, and to provide suggestions that help 
employees recognize and address ethical dilemmas resulting from these tasks. The act of 
employees performing these routine tasks is called “administrative evil” by Guy Adams and 
Danny Balfour (2009).  
The concept of administrative evil states that evil can often occur within organizations 
when workers carry out their responsibilities without concern for the end result of the work or 




how the work will be used. Adams and Balfour make a compelling case for their concept by 
explaining how government employees in Nazi Germany went about their administrative duties 
of identifying and locating Jews, locating financial records, and confiscating Jewish property 
during the Holocaust. The authors argue that Hitler could not have succeeded in implementing 
his final solution without the assistance of these administrative workers. Even those who may 
have disagreed with Hitler’s actions nevertheless continued doing their jobs that helped the Nazis 
torture and murder the Jewish population of Germany; thus, according to the authors, these 
workers engaged in administrative evil.  
ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL AT WELLS FARGO 
Consider the following headline: “That Wells Fargo Account Scandal was Even Worse 
Than You Can Imagine” (Hiltzik, 2020). The scandal refers to sales employees at Wells Fargo 
Bank opening millions of unauthorized customer accounts and then charging fees to the 
unsuspecting customers. According to Hiltzik, as many as 30,000 employees every month 
exhibited suspicious sales activity, but only three or four of these employees were investigated 
for sales misconduct. Even if Wells Fargo executives encouraged these clearly unethical sales 
practices, why would tens of thousands of employees go about their day completing tasks they 
knew would cause harm to others? The Wells Fargo affair involved many people in the bank, not 
just the sales employees. Managers, accountants, human resource personnel, attorneys, and many 
other bank employees knew what was happening, but nevertheless continued performing their 
administrative duties according to a Department of Treasury report from 2020. Based on Adams’ 
and Balfour’s definition, what happened at Wells Fargo was an example of administrative evil in 
the corporate world.   




There are multiple management theories to explain why people engage in certain 
behaviors and understanding these theories may help managers recognize how their actions and 
the resulting corporate culture may be leading employees in the wrong direction. While it is 
common knowledge that organizational culture is created by executive leadership, this paper 
attempts to provide an explanation of why employees continued to work at Wells Fargo knowing 
their work contributed to the harm of others. The topics to be discussed include social 
conformity, groupthink, group polarization, bystander effect, diffusion of responsibility, and 
organizational culture. 
SOCIAL CONFORMITY 
Social conformity is one of many academic explanations for peer pressure, and 
researchers have identified three motives for conforming to group pressure: 1) compliance; 2) 
identification; and 3) internalization (Hackman, 1992). The compliance motive is the most basic 
of the three and refers to people who conform to avoid punishment or to receive rewards from 
the group. For example, an employee who dislikes his job but continues to work in the same 
position conforms to company requirements to avoid the punishment of being fired and to 
continue the reward of receiving a paycheck. The identification motive refers to an individual 
who is attracted to a particular group and wants to identify with the group. For example, a 
college student who is attracted to a particular fraternity or sorority will often conform to what 
the group wants in order to become a member. The identity with the group is important; 
therefore, the motive for following the rules of the group is based on their identity as a group 
member. The internalization motive refers to an individual who genuinely believes in what a 
group stands for and wants to help the group succeed. One example is a person who volunteers 
for military service, knowing the military has strict rules and policies governing behavior and 




actions. The genuine belief in the military function and the desire to help accomplish security 
goals for the country helps the person internalize military requirements and accept them as 
necessary in carrying out the organizational goals. 
Using the three motives to explain the administrative evil occurring in Nazi Germany, it 
is quite likely that some government employees conformed due to fear (compliance motive), 
some conformed because they were attracted to the political party in power and wanted to be 
identified as a dedicated Nazi (identification motive), and some conformed because they truly 
believed in the Nazi goal to eradicate the Jewish population (internalization motive). Of the three 
motives, the easiest to identify is compliance because there is historical information to show how 
the Nazi government treated people who disagreed with their political goals. Likewise, the 
compliance motive is the easiest to identify for the Wells Fargo situation since there are 
historical facts and legal testimony regarding the scandal. 
Compliance 
Compliance refers to the desire to avoid punishment or to obtain rewards from the group. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, Adams and Balfour suggest administrative servants in Nazi Germany 
may have continued their work out of fear of losing their jobs or of even worse punishment. The 
situation with Wells Fargo employees may have been similar. Indeed, a January, 2020, report 
from the U.S. Department of the Treasury states that, “The Community Bank’s business model 
and the senior leaders of the Bank presented a stark dilemma to employees every day for 14 
years: they could engage in sales practices misconduct—much of which was illegal—to meet 
their goals, or they could struggle to meet their goals and face adverse consequences, including 
losing their jobs” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 4). The threat of termination 




is a powerful influence on employees who need to work, and the following comments from the 
Treasury report reflect this influence on Well Fargo employees. 
• “[T]he noose around our necks ha[s] tightened: we have been told we must achieve the 
required solutions goals or [we] will be terminated. . .” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 
2020, p. 11). 
• “Management within the Community Bank implemented aggressive ‘flogging’ techniques, 
including: …Warning employees that if they did not achieve sales goals, they would be 
‘transferred to a store where someone had been shot and killed’ and if they did not make 
enough appointments they would be ‘forced to walk out in the hot sun around the block’ ”  
(U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, pp. 20-21). 
Fear is a powerful motivator, and organizations should use it to encourage employees to 
engage in legal and respectful behaviors toward others. In the Wells Fargo case, however, it 
appears to have been used to encourage questionable behavior instead. 
GROUPTHINK 
 
Another academic explanation for peer pressure is groupthink. Groupthink is a situation 
in which people make irrational decisions because of a desire to maintain group cohesion and 
harmony (Janis, 1982). Groupthink is often studied in executive-level decision-making, and the 
most famous example is the decision made by the Kennedy administration to invade Cuba in 
1961. The Bay of Pigs Invasion was a disastrous decision in which Kennedy’s cabinet members 
believed their knowledge of the Cuban situation was superior to all others and, as a result, 
dissenting information was discounted and openly discouraged in discussions. Without the 
benefit of competing perspectives, the group became more certain their incorrect assessment of 




the situation was accurate. To help leaders avoid the pitfalls of groupthink, eight symptoms have 
been identified in three categories (Janis, 1982).  
1) Overestimation of the group:  
a. illusion of invulnerability; b) unquestioned belief in morality  
2) Closed mindedness:  
a. rationalization; b) stereotyping 
3) Pressure toward uniformity of thought:  
a. pressure to conform; b) mindguarding; c) illusion of unanimity; d) self-
censorship.  
Five individuals in executive leadership positions at Wells Fargo displayed all of these 
symptoms at one point, as described in the Treasury report. These five individuals held positions 
as Former Head of the Community Bank, Former Community Bank Group Risk Officer, Former 
General Counsel, Former Chief Auditor, and Former Executive Audit Director: all top 
managerial positions implying strong interconnections.  Irving L. Janis explains that groupthink 
may result from strong group cohesion and group identity (Janis, 1982). In fact, the more 
cohesive the group, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced with 
groupthink.  Group cohesion is often increased when groups are successful and when the group 
is threatened by external forces (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). The executives at Wells Fargo 
enjoyed massive financial success, and anyone who questioned their methods would naturally be 
perceived as threat. Thus, financial success and perceived threats served to enhance group 
cohesion, thereby opening the door for groupthink. The following illustrations from the U.S. 
Treasury Report provide sobering examples of each of the eight groupthink symptoms. 
Illusion of Invulnerability 




The illusion of invulnerability gives groups a false sense of security, suggesting they are 
invulnerable to external forces. As a result, the groups become overly optimistic, fail to respond 
to danger signals, and take extraordinary risks. For Wells Fargo executives, this illusion of 
invulnerability not only led them to ignore the danger signals about the sales misconduct, but 
also led them to mislead and withhold information from federal investigators. 
• “Respondent Russ Anderson continued to instruct her staff at these meetings to limit the 
information provided to the OCC regarding sales practices…For example, in June 2015, the 
Bank was in the process of compiling information for the OCC on the topic of capturing 
customer consent signature for Bank products. Although her staff advised her that the OCC 
requested information regarding signature requirements for deposit products, on June 24, 
2015 Respondent Russ Anderson commented in an email that the OCC “did not ask about 
deposits and we shouldn’t add it. I’ll edit it out when they [Respondent Russ Anderson’s 
staff] send it” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, pp. 59-60). 
Unquestioned belief in morality 
 
 Unquestioned belief in morality occurs when groups discredit contradictory opinions, 
explain how the contradictory perspectives are wrong, and ignore any moral consequences that 
may result from the group’s actions. In essence, the group truly believes in the inherent morality 
of the group above all else. According to the US Treasury report, Wells Fargo leaders had 
several warnings from multiple sources that sales practices were problematic but ignored them 
and demanded the questionable practices continue.   
• “Despite continued warnings from senior regional leaders, Corporate Investigations, and 
Bank employees about ongoing sales practices misconduct across the Community Bank and 
its root cause, Respondent Tolstedt demanded double-digit annual sales growth and required 




regions to grow cross-sell, which entailed selling additional products and services to existing 
customers” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 45). 
Rationalization 
 
 Rationalization occurs when people justify their actions to excuse their behavior.  
Justifying questionable conduct gives the individual a plausible reason to continue the behavior, 
regardless of any negative consequences. In the passage below, Wells Fargo executives 
rationalize the bank’s high turnover rate by making an inaccurate comparison to other industries. 
• “The aggressive sales culture resulted in significant employee turnover, approximately 35% 
annually. The high turnover rate in the Community Bank indicated that sales pressure was 
excessive and was driving employee separations... The turnover rate in the retail branch network 
was significantly higher than in peer banks… Respondent Tolstedt and her management team 
justified the high turnover rate by comparing it to that of retail companies like Macy’s and Target 
rather than other banks” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 22). 
Stereotyping 
 
 Stereotyping is the practice of assuming all individuals in a particular group are the same 
simply by virtue of group membership. In groupthink, stereotyping is often used as a way to 
marginalize or discredit any group that has a different perspective. In the passage below, the 
Chief Security Officer is informing the Chief Auditor that the bank’s Group Risk Officer was not 
taking the sales issue seriously and was minimizing the seriousness of the problem to executives. 
The dismissal of the security officer’s concerns is a form of stereotyping that appears to 
marginalize all security personnel reporting on the problem, despite having evidence from 
multiple sources. 
• “In July 2012, the Chief Security Officer and Head of Corporate Investigations informed 
Respondent Julian: “[O]ur data continues to highlight a concerning trend in the area of Sales 




Integrity – from the increase in EthicsLine reports, to the increase in executive complaint 
letters / OCC referral, and increases in confirmed fraud, thus, we need to continue to escalate 
this issue with senior leadership. . . . Our data continues to point to a very negative trend.” 
The Chief Security Officer and Head of Corporate Investigations also informed Respondent 
Julian in the email that Respondent Russ Anderson, the Community Bank’s Group Risk 
Officer, was “minimizing” the seriousness of the problem to executive management”  (U.S. 
Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 86). 
Pressure to conform 
 
 Individuals in a groupthink situation who express doubt about the group’s action are 
often subjected to intense pressure to conform to the group. A segment from the 2020 U.S. 
Treasury Department report illustrates the extreme pressure to conform by indicating employer 
expectations are so unreasonable, employees are forced to behave inappropriately.  
• “When employees are required to meet unreasonable numbers, they are forced into 
inappropriate activity to keep their jobs. … Wells Fargo is playing a shell game – they are 
rewarding employees for fake accounts and will terminate them if they find out this is the 
case” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 11). 
Mindguard 
 
 Mindguarding is the act of protecting group members from contradictory information that 
could break the illusion of group morality and effectiveness. Individual mindguards often tell 
others what to think or say to continue supporting group efforts. At Wells Fargo, when a bank 
official’s wife was a victim of sales misconduct, the Head of the Community Bank asked the 
official to stop telling the story because it made the bank look bad. 




• “In the first half of 2012, a former Operating Committee member’s wife received two debit 
cards in the mail she did not request. He raised this to the Head of the Community Bank, 
Respondent Tolstedt. Respondent Tolstedt later asked the former Operating Committee 
member to stop telling the story because she thought it reflected poorly on the Community 
Bank. Saving face prevailed over determining and fixing the root cause of the sales practices 
misconduct problem” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 13). 
Illusion of unanimity 
 
 Illusion of unanimity refers to the illusion that everyone is in agreement with a decision 
or situation. Because of that illusion, anyone who disagrees is hesitant to voice a contradictory 
opinion and ultimately conforms to the group. If someone is brave enough to question the 
group’s actions, leaders sometimes dismiss their concerns or use selective perception to filter out 
opposing viewpoints. The passage below suggests leaders at Wells Fargo either had an illusion 
of unanimity or purposely led others to believe there was unanimity in the bank’s actions. 
• “Respondent Russ Anderson told examiners during the May 2015 OCC Meeting that 
interviews with employees “did not lead to conclusions about sales pressure,” that she does 
not “hear” about pressure from personal bankers “at all,” and that “people are positive and 
pleased” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 59). 
Self censorship 
 
 Self censorship refers to groups who keep silent about issues and minimize the 
importance of the situation. The excerpt below describes how senior managers at Wells Fargo 
were notified about sales misconduct by thousands of people but chose to downplay the situation 
and self-censor their comments by withholding information on the problem. 




• “Customers and employees wrote letters and emails detailing the sales practices misconduct 
problem to senior executives with the authority and responsibility to address it. Nonetheless, 
the sales practices misconduct problem persisted because senior management, including 
Respondents, blamed individual employees for the problem, refused to address the actual 
root cause, downplayed the problem’s seriousness and scope, and failed to provide accurate 
and complete reporting on the problem” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 13).  
As illustrated by the examples above, Groupthink is very damaging to organizations, 
particularly when thoughtful decisions are required to cope with problems. In the Wells Fargo 
case, the executive leadership displayed all eight groupthink symptoms and apparently believed 
their actions and decisions were appropriate in spite of mounting evidence to the contrary.  
GROUP POLARIZATION 
 Group polarization refers to group decisions and actions that become more extreme in a 
group setting than would otherwise occur if the individual acted on his own (Isenberg, 1986).  
For example, individual employees may go into a meeting thinking an aggressive growth goal 
would be to open ten new locations in the next year. However, as the group discusses the goal, 
they decide the goal should be to open thirty new locations the next year instead. Polling 
employees individually, the most aggressive goal was ten, but somehow the group became more 
polarized during the meeting and developed a more aggressive goal than anyone imagined. The 
difference in group polarization and groupthink is that group polarization strengthens the original 
group attitude to extremes when supported by group discussion while groupthink causes 
members to modify their decisions to match the group consensus. An example of group 
polarization is presented below and describes how managers at Wells Fargo pushed sales goals to 




extreme levels, almost giving the impression that managers are competing with one another in 
demanding unrealistic sales. 
• “In some cases, even employees who exceeded their sales goals could and did receive 
corrective action for their sales performance. An investigations manager wrote in a 2009 
email: “[W]e are hearing the [local regional president] has told or insinuated that everyone 
must make 120% of their goals, no exceptions. We have been made aware that some team 
members have actually be[en] form[ally] counseled for making [104%] and 110% of their 
goals. In addition we discovered that one manager was getting ready to terminate a banker 
for being at 105%” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 19).  
An observer of the Wells Fargo situation may understand the pressure on individuals to 
conform but may also wonder how thousands of employees were unable to change the situation. 
The bystander effect and diffusion of responsibility help explain why this happens. 
BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 The bystander effect occurs when a victim is ignored even when other people are present 
and witness the situation (Fischer et al., 2011). Classic studies of the bystander effect often have 
an actor pretend to get sick on a busy street and call for help. Astonishingly, bystanders walk 
over or around the victim with almost no one stopping to assist. The more bystanders present, the 
less likely the individual is to get help. In the Wells Fargo case, the sales misconduct and the toll 
it was taking on employees was well-known. Although many complained, many more did 
nothing but observe coworkers suffering.  
• “Low performers typically were called out in front of their peers and asked to explain how 
they would improve their sales performance: “Be adults and get your asses on our calls. It’s 
pathetic that I have to remind you all. And everyone se[ems] to have an excuse. Go work at 




Walmart if you cannot handle any of the aforementioned. Thank you” (U.S. Department of 
Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 21). 
DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 Diffusion of responsibility is often paired with the bystander effect in explaining social 
behavior (Latane & Dabbs, 1975). The concept refers to an individual taking less responsibility 
for a situation if other people are present. In other words, responsibility is spread among all 
present if something bad happens rather than responsibility placed on one individual. So, if 
twenty bystanders ignore a sick person on the street, then responsibility is diffused among all 
twenty bystanders and each individual is only 1/20th responsible for the situation. At Wells 
Fargo, hundreds of thousands of employees engaged in illegal activity, and diffusion of 
responsibility would then suggest that each person was only 1/100,000th responsible for the 
illegal activity. Perhaps this is why the misconduct lasted for several years. 
• “Put another way, while 30,000 employees per month engaged in activity that was indicative 
of just one type of sales practices misconduct, the Bank decided to devote resources to 
investigate only three employees per month” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 
27). 
• “Hundreds of thousands of employees in the Bank’s largest line of business engaged in 
systemic illegal activity for 14 years. The Law Department allowed and enabled this systemic 
illegal activity to persist” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 76). 
Interestingly, researchers have suggested that a vocal minority can change the majority 
opinion, but the minority must speak up and make their views known (Moscovici,1976). A 
healthy organizational culture allows employees to voice their opinions and prevent the negative 
conformity issues discussed above.  






Edgar Schein identified three levels of organizational culture (Schein, 1990): artifacts, 
values, and assumptions. Artifacts are the surface level of culture that include verbal and visible 
cues to indicate the organization’s way of doing things. Wells Fargo artifacts included 
publicizing their cross-sell metric in corporate memos and by telling employees “every customer 
needs a credit card.”  
• “The Bank touted a metric known as “cross-sell,” or the “cross-sell ratio,” that measured the 
number of products sold per household” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 4).  
• “In April 2015, an SSCOT manager who reported directly to Respondent Russ Anderson 
shared with her Facebook posts from a former Bank branch manager. The posts stated: 
“[Wells Fargo management] have created a toxic atmosphere of sales goals that forces 
employees to sell products [customers] don’t want. They literally say ‘every customer needs 
a credit card.’ . . . If there is ever a company as disgusting and unethical as this one, I dare 
you to find it” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 59). 
Values are the next higher level of cultural understanding and reflect members’ shared 
opinions of how things should be. At Wells Fargo, values apparently included engaging in 
misconduct to achieve sales goals. 
• “I am NOT writing this letter to bring an investigation on my store, my district, my region – 
that is not where the root of the problem lies. It lies on upper management who has increased 
the goals to the ‘must cheat to achieve’ level.” (emphasis in original).” (U.S. Department of 
Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 12) 
• “Make your goals at any cost to the team member or customer – this is our environment. . . . I 
cant [sic] sleep at night or look in the mirror. Too much pressure, feels like we have to treat 




team members poorly or walk a very grey line to meet expectations” (U.S. Department of 
Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 13). 
Assumptions are beliefs that are taken for granted in an organization and form the core 
culture of the organization. When members believe the organization wants them to achieve sales 
growth at any cost, that leads to an assumption that any behavior is acceptable, especially when 
organization members see the memos, the illegal activity, the reward system for those who cheat, 
the punishment for those who do not meet goals, and the illusion that everyone is in agreement 
that this behavior is acceptable.  Indeed, a Netflix documentary in the Dirty Money series about 
Wells Fargo Bank featured one employee who explained the pressure to sell was so widely 
accepted that she thought there was something wrong with her rather than with the bank’s 
actions (Krauss, 2020). The passage below illustrates how multiple employees and committees 
reported misconduct to the Wells Fargo General Counsel who took no action to address the 
problem. If the organization’s legal counsel does nothing, one cannot help but assume the 
organization condones illegal activity and thus all actions to continue the illegal behavior is 
expected of all employees. 
• “Throughout Respondent Strother’s tenure as General Counsel, multiple sources supplied 
him with information regarding the extent, scope, and root cause of sales practices 
misconduct and the Bank’s deficient controls. Those sources included: the attorneys who 
worked for him in the Law Department; various management committees on which he was a 
member; and employees across Community Bank regions who wrote letters and emails to 
him and other members of the Operating Committee expressing concern about pressure to 
meet unreasonable sales goals causing illegal activity across the Bank and pleading for 
change. Regardless of the amount of information Respondent Strother received about sales 




practices misconduct, he took no meaningful action to address the problem or inform the 
Board or the CEO about the problem” (U.S. Department of Treasury, OCC, 2020, p. 63) 
The US Treasury Report reveals problems throughout the Wells Fargo organization that 
could easily occur in other companies. Indeed, Enron, Worldcom, AIG, and Tyco are just a few 
of the corporate names studied in business ethics courses, and executives must constantly guard 
against ethical lapses in their organizations. Leadership training is one method of helping 
executives remain vigilant in this endeavor.  
MITIGATING ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL 
Leadership emanating from the top of an organization is said to have a downward 
cascading effect on lower levels of management (Bass et al., 1987). The importance of this effect 
cannot be understated given that top management, and in particular, the CEO, serves as a role 
model for subordinates, has a motivating influence, reinforces, and even changes the culture of 
an organization. To avoid the deleterious effect of administrative evil, leaders should consider 
practicing servant leadership which has been illustrated to achieve desired ethical behaviors.  
Servant Leadership 
Servant leadership is characterized by an overarching motivation to serve others, practice 
humility, make decisions from a moral/ethical perspective, and foster an inclusive workplace. It 
has been found to achieve numerous prosocial behaviors in organizations (Greenleaf, 1977), and 
these outcomes have been replicated across numerous industries, cultures, and contexts. To 
mitigate against administrative evil in the workplace, we describe these specific attributes and 
behaviors associated with servant leadership in greater detail. First, servant leaders promote 
egalitarianism by listening to the needs and concerns of subordinates by soliciting their ideas, 
irrespective of their level within the organization. In doing so, this creates a culture of safety and 




inclusiveness where employees can voice their concerns and are not pressured to act in 
inappropriate ways to achieve organizational goals. Moreover, by fostering a culture where a 
multitude of diverse of ideas are shared, this also mitigates the deleterious effects of groupthink. 
Second, the humility and motivation to serve others inherent in servant leaders impels these 
individuals to admit their mistakes, which in turn, mitigates any escalation of commitment 
toward unattainable or unrealistic goals. Finally, the normative ethical decision making mindset 
found in servant leaders is expected to promote organizational-wide policies and practices for 
preventing wrongdoing such as rewarding employees as a group first, performing annual ethics 
audits in conjunction with HR and outside consultants, and establishing whistleblowing hotlines 
which are monitored by independent observers who are not beholden to upper management. 
In addition to training top management to be servant leaders, servant leadership and its 
attendant behaviors can be instilled in all levels of management, even in rank-and-file members 
of the organization (van Dierendonck, 2011, p. 238). Therefore, the ultimate goal of this servant 
leadership will ensure that employees as well as management have a sense of purpose and 
direction while being guided by their inner moral compass in the workplace. Servant leadership 
has been successfully implemented by many successful large organizations which include 
Starbucks, The Container Store, AFLAC Insurance, and Zappos, among others (Schwantes, 
2017). In summary, focusing on the well-being of employees not only provides the best checks 
and balances to prevent administrative evil, it also promotes productive and successful 
organizations.  
Leadership training is a necessary part of operating an ethical organization, but it is not 
sufficient. The concept of administrative evil refers to rank and file employees who obligingly 
conduct work that has negative consequences on others. While leaders have great influence over 




the organization, their behavior should not excuse employee actions in carrying out evil orders. 
Thus, in addition to servant leadership training at all levels of an organization, it is important to 
discuss specific employee training that encourages employee accountability for their actions.  
Employee Training and Accountability 
 Everyone prefers to associate with others who think, feel, and act the same way they do 
because similarity is comfortable. In the workplace, however, employees need to view situations 
from multiple perspectives to make good business decisions, and this requires being receptive to 
people who think, feel, and act differently from one another. Thus, training sessions on effective 
listening could help reduce some of the awkwardness experienced when disagreement occurs. 
When organizations foster an environment of constructive dialogue that welcomes different 
viewpoints, the pressure to conform to the group is diminished, and simply appointing a person 
to be a devil’s advocate could guard against the illusion of unanimity and self-censorship.  
 Reward systems are key in motivating employees to engage in the desired behaviors, and 
these systems must ensure the reward is tied to open, but constructive, dialogue. In the Wells 
Fargo situation, employees who tried to discuss problems with unrealistic sales goals were 
punished by being marginalized or even terminated. In a more typical organization, employees 
who question company actions may be ostracized by coworkers and managers, but the employee 
should be rewarded for speaking up. Even if the employee’s assessment of the situation is 
incorrect, the organization should express appreciation for their input and explain the company’s 
position as needed. This not only clarifies the situation for the employee, but also sends a 
message to all employees that different viewpoints are welcome. 
 Employees who find themselves in a situation like Wells Fargo are unlikely to change the 
overall organization, and fear of being terminated may lead them to rationalize the unethical 




behavior as acceptable. However, employees are independent human beings who make their own 
choices and cannot put all the blame on managers for unethical employee actions. The following 
influence tactics may help employees who want to continue working for an organization without 
conforming to unethical practices. 
Influence Tactics 
 Rational persuasion is one of several influence tactics taught in organizational behavior 
courses and is used when an individual makes logical arguments backed with factual evidence to 
persuade another person. In the Wells Fargo situation, concerned employees may have been able 
to clarify expectations of behavior by asking a series of questions about: 1) the sales goals; 2) 
training on how to meet the sales goals; and 3) the likelihood of reaching the sales goals. Once 
employees presented facts to illustrate the unrealistic nature of the goals, they could have tried to 
use logic to persuade the local manager to adjust. Other components of rational persuasion could 
include asking what would happen if the public learned about the bank’s sales practices to 
illustrate the negative publicity that could ensue and what the legal ramifications would be. 
Finally, the employee could have researched what their own personal legal liability would be if 
the sales practices were made public. This latter point is important since Wells Fargo protected 
executives and blamed “rogue” employees for the ethical lapses.  
 Coalition is another influence tactic that is used when an employee enlists the support of 
others to persuade management to agree with their position. It was clear from the Treasury 
Report that several employees were concerned about the sales practices, but it also appeared 
from the report that these employees acted individually and not as a group. Would it have made a 
difference if several employees at one bank or in one region had banded together to present their 
concerns as a group? There is strength in numbers, and if entire banks or entire regions supported 




other employees, perhaps the company would have taken action to address the issue. At a 
minimum, employees would have known they were not alone in their concerns.  
  While these influence tactics may not have changed anything at Wells Fargo, they may 
be useful at other organizations with less entrenched cultures. In situations that are truly 
unethical and contrary to personal beliefs, the employee’s best option may be to quit to avoid 
stress and potential legal issues. The danger of administrative evil is the complacence of 
administrative employees simply going about their work, and the following table summarizes the 
information presented from above.  
 
Sources of Administrative Evil 
 
Mitigating Sources of Administrative Evil 
• Social Conformity 
• Groupthink 
• Group Polarization 
• Bystander Effect 
• Diffusion of Responsibility 
• Organizational Culture 
• Training to increase employee effectiveness in 
accepting and conveying ideas and concerns 
o Servant Leadership 
o Effective listening 
o Influence tactics 
• Clarifying expectations of open dialogue that welcomes 
all viewpoints 
• Creating a culture that supports ethical behavior 
o Artifacts – slogans 
o Values – appropriate reward systems 
o Assumptions – consistent language and actions 
illustrating correct behavior 
 
CONCLUSION 
The word “evil” has strong connotations, and cavalier use of the word by speakers 
outside of a religious setting is often associated with exaggeration or disbelief by listeners. 
However, Adams and Balfour use the term “evil” in a thoughtful way to explain how some 
unethical acts often go unchallenged by members of the organization. As a result, the 
organization commits an “evil” act even when members do not approve of the action. 




Three main factors contribute to what Adams and Balfour call “administrative evil.” The 
first factor is technical rationality, a way of thinking and living that emphasizes the scientific 
analytic mindset and the belief in technological progress. This emphasis involves using modern 
technology to be efficient and rational in making decisions, but the efficiency may act as a 
substitute for ethical considerations in completing work. In the case of Wells Fargo, modern 
technology included using information systems that allowed employees to bypass proper controls 
for customer protections against fraud. The second factor is the modern, complex organization 
itself which often allows individual responsibility to be diffused in a way that lets the individual 
escape accountability for actions taken on behalf of the organization. Hundreds of thousands of 
employees at Wells Fargo engaged in misconduct that went unchallenged for fourteen years. The 
third factor is moral inversion, a process of redefining something evil as something good. The 
executive leadership team at Wells Fargo defined sales growth at any cost as good while 
conveniently ignoring the illegal aspect of the behavior. 
As mentioned earlier, however, it was not possible for the illegal activity at Wells Fargo 
to occur without the acquiescence of employees. Evidence shows that some employees spoke out 
against the culture, but the vast majority continued their activities. Auditors, attorneys, managers, 
and human resources personnel whose jobs were not at risk for low sales growth nonetheless 
carried out their administrative duties knowing their jobs helped efficiently run an organization 
that was causing harm to customers and employees. To guard against administrative evil in 
organizations, it is necessary to consider training but also to hold both employees and executive 
leadership accountable for their actions. 
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